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Safety and Disaster through Indefinition Paul Baender 
(A lecture given before the Hesperis Institute for 
Humanistic Studies at Cornell College, Mt. Vernon, 
Iowa, December 8, 1978.) 
MANY YEARS AGO I began noticing in American fiction a recurrent 
configuration of characters, wherein one or a few individuals in a plot were 
represented as multi-talented and variously oriented, and the remainder 
were 
represented as fixed in limited identities?a mother of a particular and 
determinative background; a father or other older male of a particular and 
clear disposition; friends, enemies and lovers whose behavior did not vary 
so much as to confuse a sense of their nature; and so forth. I was aware that 
the attribution of complexity to a central character and simplicity to minor 
ones was a means of achieving perspective and emphasis, and that such 
strategic attribution could be found throughout literary history. But in the 
configurations I was concerned about, the mixed characters, as I shall call 
them temporarily, were at times not central to their plots?indeed were 
often on the fringe?and their mixtures as against the other characters' 
simplicities were issues in the plots. For instance, there are several conversa 
tions in W. D. Howells's A Hazard of New Fortunes (1890) in which the staid 
and well-defined characters attempt to come to terms with the "versatility" 
of the artist Angus Beaton. I knew that what I was noticing in these 
configurations was substance, not mere instrumentation, and from their 
recurrence over several generations of our writers I believed I was on the 
track of something that had a strong cultural pull. And so I set out to 
explore. 
My preliminary formulations were based largely upon recollections of 
earlier reading, and consequently they had an imbalance of the monumental 
and spectacular, which my memory is prone to retain. I thought of Natty 
Bumppo, James Fenimore Cooper's Leatherstocking, that hero who evinced 
the fullest manhood through embodying the cultures of the wilderness and 
of civilization?and that same character surrounded by a comic pedant, a 
fierce Redman, a Noble Savage, a greedy pioneer, a sterling gentleman, and 
the rest of Cooper's crowd, all of them crudely simple and many of them 
commonplace, but against whose trite simplicity Leatherstocking's new 
and transcendent richness of character was all the more striking. I thought 
of historical persons who, like Leatherstocking, had been characterized as 
combining cultures ordinarily polar. I recalled the famous St. Aubin 
engraving of Benjamin Franklin wearing both wire-rimmed spectacles and 
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a fur hat: the spectacles identified the cosmopolitan philosopher while the 
hat proclaimed the child of nature. There was Thomas Jefferson, of whom 
it became formulaic praise to say that because of his family background he 
was both Tuckahoe and Cohee?that is, both lowland and upland, both 
plantation and backwoods, both aristocrat and yeoman. Though the geo 
graphic scope of this gamut may seem parochial, the formula claimed for 
Jefferson a native cultural hospitality and reconciliation no less extensive 
than that of the Pharaohs, who embodied both Lower Egypt and Upper 
Egypt and, as "opposites in equilibrium," contained both Horus and Seth, 
the warring gods respectively associated with the two kingdoms (Henri 
Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods). Again in fiction, I thought of an 
American's fantasy about the son of an English lord raised among African 
apes, whose heredity and upbringing were so disparate as to support the 
repeated affectations of wonderment with which the author celebrated his 
creation: "How may we judge him, by what standards, this ape-man with 
the heart and head and body of an English gentleman, and the training of a 
wild beast?" 
The emergence of such examples in my early thinking led me to believe 
that my subject was the representation in American literature of paragons of 
versatility?of Americans as in general they aspired to be and as a few were 
fortunate enough to have been. I knew that by "versatility" I did not mean 
the possession of various talents and skills, often associated with the Yankee 
and with frontier culture, which primitive or other necessities might bring 
into action. This went with being human, like having a left hand to drive 
the nail and a 
right hand to hold the board. It was an accidental variation of 
merely practical importance whether one person had ten units of such 
versatility to another person's six, and there was no way the person of six 
could emulate the person often. My subject, I thought, was what I called 
"radical versatility." By that I mean the presence in a single character of 
dispositions and cultural traits not expected to be in combination, indeed 
conceived to be incompatible, and yet which made him grow into a fullness 
of spirit beyond prejudice, special interest, and trivial attachment?as 
Henry James said of his Christopher Newman: "in a posture of general 
hospitality to the chances of life, of being very much at one's own dispos 
al." Consequently I envisioned my subject as an extension from R. W. B. 
Lewis's remarkable book, The American Adam. Professor Lewis had es 
tablished for American culture during the period 1820-1860 a dialectic 
between what he called the Party of Hope and the Party of Memory as to a 
developing myth of the new American, without determinative or even 
known origins, who breaks with tradition to create himself and to make a 
world in the process ofthat creation. My job would be to modify certain 
contours, document certain trends, and introduce certain stresses, most 
usefully for the periods beyond 1860, where Professor Lewis virtually 
ended his coverage. 
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But when I began to read around in American literature of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries I started seeing things that made me reconsider 
my categories. Characters in fiction that were radically versatile in the ways 
I have described were not always oriented toward the future, were often 
represented as having escaped diachrony by bearing within them the past 
and by pre-empting the future, and at times were able to dilate and conspire 
only with the alien winds of the south seas (Melville, Typee), Latin America 
(Richard Harding Davis, Soldiers of Fortune), or other places remote from 
America with her commitment to progress through time. On the other 
hand, the staid characters in the fictions?and many popular educators and 
moralists who have addressed American youth over the generations?have 
been the progressives in the obvious sense of the term. They may defend 
traditional standards of purposiveness and industry and, like Henry Ward 
Beecher, recommend those traits on the score of their being "old-fash 
ioned" (Lectures to Young Men, 1845), but this sort of affectionate appeal is 
toward the end of confirming the Tightness of the historical movement to 
which they are committed. The restricted characters in the fictions and the 
moralists in actual experience may specifically attack versatility, like the 
clergyman Theodore T. Munger in another book for young men, On the 
Threshold (1880), where he said that "Versatility is overpraised," or like the 
conventional characters in Howells's A Hazard of New Fortunes, who rede 
fine Angus Beaton's versatility as selfishness. But these are not the attacks 
of a Party of Memory on a Party of the Future; they are condemnations of a 
self-indulgence that threatens the perpetuation and progress of society. 
Perhaps the key experience in my reading, the one that made me seriously 
doubt that my subject was radical versatility as such versus concentration of 
effort as such, was James Gibbons Huneker. Huneker himself was a ver 
satile man. Born in Philadelphia in 1860, he was a gifted musician who 
studied piano at the Paris Conservatory, after having dabbled in mechanical 
work and in law. For ten years he taught at the National Conservatory of 
Music in New York. In 1900 he began a long career with the New York 
Sun as music, drama, and art critic, in all of which he was expert. In 
addition to his articles for the Sun, and near the end of his life for the New 
York Times and the New York World, Huneker produced many books, 
including an important early work on Chopin, books of drama and art 
criticism, stories, autobiography, and one novel, Painted Veils, published 
shortly before his death in 1921. In his autobiography, Steeplejack, and 
throughout his other books Huneker used the words "versatile" and 
"versatility" as terms of ultimate praise so often as to make them seem like 
such conversational counters as "cool" or "neat"?the conveniences of 
someone writing in a hurry, as Huneker characteristically did, who might 
fall back upon familiar terms indicating a common though imprecise value. 
Here are just some of the people he called versatile: Ibsen, Strindberg, G. B. 
Shaw, Stendhal, Baudelaire, Max Heinrich, Flaubert, Anatole France, 
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R?my de Gourmont, Richard Wagner, Victor Maurel, George Washington 
Turner (manager of The Recorder, a short-lived New York newspaper), 
Michael Cross (an early music teacher in Philadelphia), William Thompson, 
George Cabot Lodge, Joseph Conrad, George Moore, Jews in general; and 
the city of New York was "the most versatile city on our globe" (New 
Cosmopolis). 
Huneker recognized versatility in himself, and though he was fond of 
repeating his own maxim that "versatility is not heaven sent, but is largely a 
matter of elbow-grease," he regarded it as the gift of a certain temperament. 
"I had the centrifugal temperament," he wrote in Steeplejack, "not the cen 
tripetal. President Wilson has the centripetal 
... a 'one-track mind' .... 
The aptitude displayed by the Yankee for a half-dozen pursuits is the sign 
manual of the centrifugal soul. It is pleasant to hear the whirring of its 
wheels though they serve no particular purpose. Thrashing the sea, eating 
the air promise-crammed, filling the belly with the east wind, fighting 
windmills?these are a few attributes of the centrifugalist. He is nothing if 
not versatile. His intensity lasts ten minutes. . . . The sensory periphery is 
more masterful than the hub of his being." Causally behind such tempera 
ments was a culturally and ethnically mixed heritage, reminiscent of the 
"Tuckahoe and Cohee" formula applied to Thomas Jefferson. Thus the 
"dual temperament" which Huneker attributed to Flaubert could be traced 
to his parents?the father a renowned surgeon of steady, middle-class 
Champenois stock, the mother an aristocratic Norman from whom Gus 
tave "inherited his love of art, his disdain for philistines, and his adventur 
ous disposition" (Egoists). Huneker announced the comparable credentials 
of his own background: Irish on his mother's side; a mixture of Hungarian, 
English, and Pennsylvania Dutch on his father's. To Huneker the mother's 
side alone accounted for much of his 
vagariousness: "The acute sensitive 
ness, the instability of temperament, the alternations of timidity and 
rashness, the morbid exaltation and depression which were, and still are the 
stigmata of my personal 'case' 
. . . come from the Irish side of my house" 
(Steeplejack). He goes on to claim for himself "a polyphonic mind" and says 
that he enjoys "the simultaneous flight of a half-dozen trains of ideas, which 
run on parallel tracks for a certain distance, then disappear, arriving 
nowhere. ... I often suffer from 
'split' or dissociated personalities, hence 
my discursiveness?to call such fugitive ideation by so mild a name." 
Huneker's explanation of his temperament through ethnic references may 
seem to account for the evident complacency with which he admits he suf 
fers from 
" 
'split' or dissociated personalities," for such references were 
commonly made in the nineteenth century?and well into the twentieth? 
not just to establish the quiddity or "thisness" of persons but also to recom 
mend them as exceptionally broad in their orientations. In 1855, for exam 
ple, Dr. James M'Cune Smith, himself a man of mixed blood, said the fol 
lowing in his introduction to Frederick Douglass's My Bondage and My 
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Freedom: 
"[Douglass] is a Representative American man?a type of his 
countrymen. Naturalists tell us that a full grown man is a resultant or repre 
sentative of all animated nature on this globe. ... To the fullest extent, has 
Frederick Douglass passed through every gradation of rank comprised in 
our national makeup .... The versatility of talent which he wields . . . 
would seem to be the result of the grafting of the Anglo-Saxon on good, 
original, negro stock." But Huneker does not offer himself to his readers as 
this sort of comprehensive and harmonious symbol. He explicitly sees him 
self as a man disorderly, unstable, casual of purpose, ironic, easily bored, 
for whom versatility was a fortunate concommitant, and he believes that in 
so being he is not like the mass of his countrymen. He associates himself 
rather with certain Frenchmen, exceptional in their own society, who were 
superior to the "automatons" that constituted the masses. In Egoists; A 
Book of Supermen (1909) he says approvingly that Maurice Barres "boldly 
proclaimed the culte de moi, proclaimed his disdain for the barbarians who 
impinged upon his I. To study and note the fleeting shapes of his soul?in 
his case a protean psyche?was the one thing worth doing in a life of medio 
crity." In Steeplejack, again with approval, he quotes Napoleon, whom he 
calls "the superman of modern times," to the effect that liberty is necessary 
only for the few and that nothing is to be said for fraternity "even if you call 
it by such a high-sounding name as altruism." And he admires Pascal be 
cause he "has always been to me a giant intellect that could believe and dis 
believe with equal ease. There are such anomalies in the flora and fauna of 
the human soul." The admiration of an indifferent shifting from belief to 
disbelief, and maybe back, was more than incidentally an irreverence to a 
basic American piety, the piety of commitment to national purposes and 
ideals. 
I drew two conclusions about Huneker. First, he was pleased to be 
indefinite whereas definition of character and function was the rule among 
men. Second, while he might use the homely phrase "Yankee versatility," 
the significant and truly admirable instances of that power were only public 
expressions of the private indefinici?n among exceptional people. A Flau 
bert, a Barres, or indeed a Huneker did not apportion the expressions of his 
talents after considering what the public variously wanted. If the public 
were pleased and if the versatile expressions matched their several tastes, so 
much the better; if not, so much the worse for the public. For Huneker 
believed that the rare indeterminate minds were obliged to be and to express 
only themselves. The masses were ready to brand those minds as pathologi 
cal if they did not meet common expectations, and the only enduring 
security lay in the confidence that one's indefinition was supreme health. 
These conclusions are fair to Huneker and hardly controversial; not only 
fair but obvious, partly because they suggest what we already know about 
the modes of elitism and provocative dilettantism among such of his 
contemporaries as H. L. Mencken. But for me these conclusions carried 
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much farther. I realized that in attempting to characterize radical versatility 
in its typical American manifestations I had been misled by repeated 
formulations of an issue in terms of one of its practical applications. The 
basic issue lay between the conditions of an individual's being definite or 
indefinite; consistent and orderly or inconsistent and confused; willing to 
submit to identification or insisting upon remaining mysterious; seeing 
with conventional coherence or seeing kaleidoscopically; becoming some 
body or remaining nothing, but never definable though remaining 
nothing?never specifically a bum, never specifically a criminal; committed 
to causes or uncommitted without being negative. The polarities go on; I 
give only samples on the assumption that the issue is so rich and so known 
to us all that others will occur to you as I continue. The issue is everywhere 
in our literary culture, but whether it persists because it represents a chronic 
irresolution among Americans, or because it is a consequence of our being 
generations in sequence, I cannot say. I call it an issue rather than an 
antithesis because tendentiousness, crafty ideological disguises both pro and 
con, fear, jubilation, and loathing are never absent in its representations, 
and the representations always entail action explicit or implicit. For there 
are questions intimately involved to everyone who treats the matter: 
whether the person who is unformed would corrupt youth and subvert 
public morals; whether being indefinite produces enlightenment or illusion; 
whether the indefinite personality is the exception or the rule; if the 
exception, whether he should guide or remain aloof; if the rule, whether 
everyone should throw off the masks of conventional identities; whether it 
is possible to remain indefinite against the twin onslaughts of diminishment 
through biological aging and the societal pressures of family and state. 
Given the issue and these ramifications, it would be inhuman to expect 
balanced representations. 
To date I have gathered numerous cases in point, not yet enough to be 
responsibly thorough, but enough for me to feel as disconcerted as the little 
girl who said plaintively to her mother that she knew how to spell "banana" 
but didn't know where to stop. I will have time here to produce only some 
notes toward a myth of the indefinite character in American literature, with 
illustrations from several writers. In this myth a stable, normal individual 
abandons his usual way of living, and often leaves the country altogether. 
The departure is sudden and the truncation complete; in the nineteenth 
century, a New England Brahmin may sail to the Pacific or travel to the Far 
West. After his departure he finds among persons he meets, in things he 
sees, and in himself, a problematic reality of which he was previously 
unaware. Shipmates and natives of the south Pacific are not the mere 
ignorant savages of former prejudice. Some of the sailors are unintelligibly 
both coarse and brilliant, and though the natives remain savages, they have 
a 
"savage grace," as Herman Melville puts it in Typee, in the sort of benign 
oxymoron often used to express the interior condition of the indefinite 
6 
character and the true nature of the world beyond convention. (One is 
reminded of Huneker's admiration for Pascal's ability to "believe and 
disbelieve with equal ease.") In some versions of the myth, especially in the 
twentieth century, the departure does not involve travel to a locale where 
this new knowledge is peculiarly available. The departure may be signaled 
by an interior breaking of the accustomed syntax of memory, association, 
and purposive reasoning; followed by a voyage of the imagination into 
astonishing connections with the distant past and into hyperbolical fantasies 
that are never absurd, never trivial, because they issue from a liberation of 
the spirit. Thorne Smith's Cosmo Topper is a plump forty-year old banker, 
comfortably married, childless, and inhibited. One afternoon he looks into 
the eyes of his cat Scollops and discovers "that there were things he did not 
know, colors of life beyond his comprehension, impulses alien to his 
reason. With his wife's eyes it was different. He knew their every shade and 
meaning. 
. . . He knew the eyes at the office. . . . Now, however, he was 
alive to the fact that Scollops' eyes escaped all classification." Topper has 
already let himself go, and now he is prepared for the complete transforma 
tion that follows. After he buys the rebuilt automobile in which his friends 
George and Marion Kerby were killed, their ghosts lead him into frolics and 
wild debauches. In the course of the fantasy Topper finds that "his brain 
was quite playful, that it broke rules and was indifferent"; and he feels "a 
spirit of freedom and buoyancy that had never come to him during his more 
orderly r?gime." When the travel in modern versions of the myth is 
through representational landscapes, it accomplishes through its mean 
dering and aimlessness the surrender of definition. When Ken Kesey and his 
entourage known as the Merry Pranksters wander from the San Francisco 
Bay Area down south and on to New York in their psychedelic school bus, 
wired for tremendous sound, they demonstrate their liberation on the road 
through antic displays before policemen and service station attendants; no 
consummation awaits them at the terminus. 
The sequel to the departure and voyage is not the return of a culture hero 
to enact the liberation of his family or society. Even in versions of the myth 
most sympathetic to ind?finition, the sequel confirms the intransigence of 
the conventional world. In Sherwood Anderson's Many Marriages, John 
Webster, a washing-machine manufacturer, loses his routine bearings and 
feels his body to be "vaguely indefinitely connected with some vast thing," 
and he senses that at the same time he is standing by his Wisconsin factory, 
he is both in the American south and by the Sea of Galilee. In a move to 
complete his transcendence of the limits of self, he allows his puritanical 
wife and daughter to discover him parading nude before a picture of the 
Virgin Mary, and while they are in shocked submission he attempts to 
convert them with a lecture on the health of achieving psychic marriages 
with everyone and everything, so that one may "become something more 
than just one individual man and woman living one narrow circumscribed 
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life." But after the lecture Webster's wife commits suicide, and he leaves 
town for good with his secretary to protect the enlightenment given in his 
interior chaos. At the end of Topper Cosmo is reunited with his wife, but 
she does not even know where he has been; his new awarenesses are only 
his. These and similar endings do not necessarily imply frustration. In part 
they maintain the place of indefinition as a private reserve in a world of 
form, a condition which for some exponents is required for the chief use of 
indefinition, the creation of experimental art. Such endings also suggest the 
optative mood and the future reference that are always to be found in 
sympathetic versions of the myth. One wishes to restore the child mind, 
like Anderson's John Webster, and one wishes to awaken the child in 
everyone. Though the general conversions have not occurred, they may 
follow from the example of late generations. Thus the naturalist John 
Burroughs, believing that "the angel of light" must be "yoked with the 
demon of darkness" in order to "sustain the world," recommended the 
younger Whitman over the older Emerson as a prophet for the nation 
because Emerson invidiously preferred "the saints to the sinners" whereas 
Whitman had extraordinary "assimilative powers" and an "indefinite dy 
namics" (Birds and Poets, 1877). And thus in her turn, fifty years later, 
Isadora Duncan found Whitman too puritanical but called herself a "Pagan 
Puritan, or a Puritanical Pagan," and she sensed her kind of dance to be the 
appropriate vehicle to express the "half Aphrodite, half Madonna" she saw 
in Botticelli's Primavera (My Life, 1927). 
These associations with the latecoming and the future are not commit 
ments to them but are rather ways of expressing a characteristic relation of 
the indefinite mind to the constraining forces: the condition of being 
indefinite is always a departure from a precedent obligation or convention. 
But the indefinite mind is committed to 
nothing?not to an age, not to a 
place, or to anything within them. Like Walt Whitman, it is at home with 
the past as well as the future. Lacking a hierarchy of values and a bias of 
attention, the indefinite mind delights in present moments, in watching 
insects or in noting slight changes of natural coloration. The indefinite 
character may be androgynous, in some modes bisexual, old and young, 
here, there, and under your bootsoles. If he assumes a particular identity, it 
is only occasional and protean, adopted for the sake of security to the mess 
within, and is to be followed by still other guises that dupe conventional 
perception. In the aesthetic manifestos of this comprehensive and/or zero 
orientation the reconstitution of media and their products is basic. "Break 
the words," says William Carlos Williams in The Great American Novel; 
"One can make words. ... I begin small and make myself into a big 
splurging word: I take life and make it one big blurb. I begin at my 
childhood. I begin at the beginning and make one big?Bah." The indefi 
nite mind as artist produces a counter world, and though that world may 
seem a Pointillism or Surrealism gone crazy, the artist proclaims it to be 
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more honest than the world of traditional consensus, for it admits to being 
only an imaginative option, no more so that any other world in art, no 
more so than the world itself. 
All these claims on behalf of indefinition in the sympathetic myth may 
seem to us credulous and narcissistic, and there were doubts and warnings 
along those lines as far back as Hawthorne, Melville, and T. S. Arthur. In 
his first book, Typee (1846), Melville represented the cultural expansion of 
an American who jumps ship in the south Pacific. He acquires an "elasticity 
of mind" that allows him to savor experience like the natives, who are not 
preoccupied with purpose and for whom time consequently trips along "as 
the laughing couples down a country lane." But beginning with his next 
book, and with increased somberness in his later works, Melville argued 
that such rejection of stability could be enjoyed only at the cost of becoming 
a beachcomber like Dr. Long Ghost in Omoo or a feckless and unmanned 
relativist like Plotinus Plinlimmon in Pierre. On the other hand, if one 
attempted to act in the world from a new sense that everyone was 
ambiguous, the result might be the sort of disaster that comes to Pierre 
Glendinning. Disoriented by information that his father sired an illegitimate 
daughter now grown to nubility, Pierre leaves Saddle Meadows, his 
ancestral estate, abandoning his mother and his fiancee to live with the half 
sister in New York. Having surrendered his previous identity, Pierre does 
not know whether his motive is charitable or incestuous or both. The up 
shot of his departure into indefinition is insanity and death to the mother, 
his murdering a cousin, and the suicides of himself, the fiancee and the half 
sister. Earlier, in the 119th chapter of Mardi, Melville had reached the 
position that a comprehensive "elasticity of mind" was possible only in 
dreams. In dreams, but only in dreams, "my soul sinks down to the depths, 
and soars to the skies. . . . methinks all the worlds are my kin. . . ."At the 
turn of our century Mark Twain reached the same skeptical conclusion in 
one of his 
"Mysterious Stranger" manuscripts. There he imagines a world 
in which everyone has a Workaday-Self and a Dream-Self. The Workaday 
Self is stuck in his flesh and in his responsibilities, and he can be no more 
than what he does within those constraints. But Mark Twain has one of the 
Dream-Selves say of his kind: "We have no character, no one character, we 
have all characters. . . . The universe is our province; we do not know 
time, we do not know space. ..." Again, indefinition is a dream phenom 
enon that the naturalistic facts of life do not support. 
The most elaborate fictions criticizing the indefinite character are in W. 
D. Howells. In his novels A Modern Instance, A Hazard of New Fortunes, and 
The Landlord at Lion's Head he posited the indefinite characters as shallow 
upstarts?equivocal, pretentious, and selfish. In the first of these, A Modern 
Instance, Howells gives the central character Bartley Hubbard moments 
when he fantasizes about following another career than that of the special 
form of journalism he has drifted into; and when he thinks it might be nice 
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to take up politics or take on a religion. In Howells's rendering these are the 
pathetic fancies of a rootless and aimless man, a casual flirt who has let 
himself be induced into marriage by a possessive woman, an opportunist 
who does not balk at shady dealing to make a profit. In several respects 
Howells's Bartley Hubbard anticipates twentieth-century representations of 
the urban middle class through the figure of a moderately sensual man 
entering middle age without satisfying achievement and with only brief 
escapes from tedium and self-contempt through idealistic dreams, fishing 
trips, and love affairs, like Sinclair Lewis's Babbitt. But what significantly 
distinguishes Howells from Lewis and other later writers is that Howells 
deplores Bartley's failure to obey the middle-class code, for all the poignancy 
in certain passages of interior reflection he gives him. He introduces an 
exemplary character, Atherton, who in conversations with his wife and 
with another exemplary character, Ben Halleck, dominates the close of the 
book with denunciations of Bartley's selfishness, and, in his prospective 
divorce of the possessive woman, his threat to social order. By the time of 
the two later novels Howells had lost or repressed even the degree of 
sympathy he gave Bartley. Angus Beaton, the "versatile" artist in A Hazard 
of New Fortunes, is represented as a foppish poseur who tries to make 
romantic impressions upon the ladies through studied gestures of languor, 
brooding, and high sentiment. Yet his interior reflections are for the most 
part the cold calculations of self-interest. And again Howells includes nor 
mative characters to define Beaton's behavior not as that of the free, 
Bohemian spirit he wants to be thought but as an anti-social dereliction. 
With Thomas Jefferson Durgin, the problematic character of The Landlord 
at Lion's Head, the case is the same. Durgin, the bright son of a woman who 
runs a summer hotel in Vermont, goes to Harvard to prepare for the law. 
He leaves behind a fianc?e whom he betrays by flirting with a college 
widow at Cambridge. The respectable artist Westover, an older man who 
has vacationed at Lion's Head for years and has known Durgin since 
Durgin's boyhood, is appalled at the flirtation as an example of a cruel 
selfishness he thinks characteristic of Durgin. In conversations with the 
fiancee's father the conclusion is reached that Durgin is a "puzzle," a 
"mixture," and in the father's oxymoronic phrase "a comical devil," a 
savage who does not belong in society. 
Howells's reactions 
against his own creatures may seem excessive to us 
even if we take his historical context into account. But whatever ambiva 
lence he may have been trying to resolve or exorcise, he could realistically 
assume that private behavior affected the public welfare, that civilization 
was a precarious construct requiring the repeated assent of its members to 
its codes. Like T. S. Arthur and the generations of clergymen who wrote 
manuals for young men, Howells believed that individuals could indeed 
choose not to belong, and that their decision might turn the course of a 
society still in the process of formation. For the nineteenth century as a 
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whole one may say that representations of indefinite characters were 
considerations of the amorphous primordial stuff of individuals, only part 
of which would be relevant as the new society took definitive shape. 
Someone like R. H. Dana was enjoying a philosophic deep breath of free 
awareness before 
returning to Boston and commitment. Emerson, Whit 
man, and Burroughs were advocating a permissibility toward all that 
primordial stuff before it was too late. In the twentieth century criticisms of 
indefinition like Howells's are hard to find. Books of popular instruction no 
longer argue first principles but tell people how to increase their efficiency 
by controlling their minds (James L. Mursell, Streamline Your Mind, 1936, 
for example) and how to achieve well-rounded personalities through an 
economical use of leisure when, as Walter Pitkin claimed, "life begins at 
forty"? taking for granted in either case one's submission to a rigorous 
society. In the twentieth century the advocacy of indefinition is escapist as 
well as reconstitutive, and the advocates spend their greatest efforts not in a 
dialectic, for there no longer needs to be any articulate opposition, but in 
finding programs to suport their advocacy. For some the programs are 
unprecedented amalgams of Buddhism, radical politics, and bits and pieces 
of other sorts of doctrines, deliberately put together in ways that confound 
logical analysis. For others the ideological game is hopeless, and they 
advocate not a transcendence to a cultural 
"elasticity of mind," in Melville's 
phrase, but an organic mind-bending through drugs. But the essential 
tradition is unchanged. It is the tradition of wishing to be tentative, of not 
wanting to be an American Adam or anything else in particular, as if life is 
too short and the world too small to accept them on their own terms. 
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